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CASENOTES
ANTITRUST LAW: FTC OVERDUBS MERGER BY
RECORDING GIANTS
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") tried to break
into the recording industry. Though none of its songs reached the charts,
it hit the industry with a bang. Federal Trade Commission v. Warner
Communications, Inc.' is the result of a potential record company merger
that would have drastically affected the entertainment industry.
The Ninth Circuit in Warner exercised judicial reasoning and ana-
lyzed all the elements necessary for an appellate court to reverse a lower
court decision. Many of the issues presented to the district court in this
case were discretionary. Appellate courts do not often overrule discre-
tionary lower court rulings. But, where a clear-cut abuse of process oc-
curs, courts of appeal are stringent in their analysis of the case. The
opinion in this case is emitted from a per curiam order containing all the
ingredients for a textbook lesson in judicial reasoning on antitrust law in
the entertainment industry.
Warner Communications, Inc., ("WCI") is.a diversified communi-
cations company operating three record labels and distributing prer-
ecorded music2 in the United States and abroad. In 1983, WCI was the
second largest distributor of prerecorded music in the United States.
Polygram Records, Inc. ("Polygram") operates classical and popular rec-
ord labels and distributes prerecorded music in the United States and
abroad. In 1983, Polygram was the sixth largest distributor of prer-
ecorded music in the United States. These two recording companies pro-
posed to merge their distribution operations in 1983 through a joint
venture.3
Upon discovering that WCI and Polygram intended to merge and
1. 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
2. "Prerecorded music" as defined by the court is a "ready-to-play product, sold in an
attractive package which often includes artwork and linear notes." Prerecorded music in-
cludes "all recorded sound performances sold to consumers in the form of singles, long playing
albums, cassettes, tapes, eight-track cartridges and compact disks." Id. at 1163.
3. Id. at 1159. A joint venture is "an undertaking by two or more persons jointly to carry
on a single business enterprise for profit, an enterprise in which they have a community of
interest. Usually, both a sharing of profits and of losses is involved." Franco Western Oil Co. v.
Fariss, 259 Cal. App. 2d 325, 344, 66 Cal. Rptr. 458, 472 (1968). See ako 6 B. WITKIN.
SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, Partnership § 16, p. 4267.
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create a joint venture in their distribution operations, the FTC filed an
action in federal district court in California.4 The complaint sought a
preliminary injunction of the proposed merger under section 13(b) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.5 The FTC alleged that the proposed
joint venture would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act6 and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.7
During discovery, the district court ordered the FTC to produce
two memoranda prepared by members of the FTC's Bureau of Econom-
ics.8 The district court then denied the FTC's motion for preliminary
injunction. Two days later, the FTC filed an Emergency Motion for In-
junction Pending Appeal, which the court of appeals granted.9
The appellate court was faced with two issues. The first was
whether the lower court abused its discretion in denying the FTC's mo-
tion for preliminary injunction preventing WCI and Polygram from
merging. If the court found an abuse of discretion, it would then need to
resolve the second issue of whether the court should grant a preliminary
injunction. In its final determination, the court reversed the lower court
holding and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the merger.
A denial of a preliminary injunction will be reversed if the district
court abused its discretion or used an erroneous legal premise.' ° The
FTC claimed that WCI and Polygram would violate the Clayton Act if
they were allowed to merge. The purpose of the Clayton Act is to arrest
4. Unpublished opinion. For a brief discussion of the lower court opinion, see 1984-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,025.
5. 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b) (West Supp. 1985). "Whenever the Commission has reason to
believe . . . that any . . . corporation is violating or is about to violate, any provision of law
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission . . . the Commission . . . may bring suit in a
district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice. Upon a proper showing
that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of success, such an
action would be in the public interest, [the injunction may be granted]."
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1985). "No person [corporation] . . . shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . or any part
of the assets of another person [corporation] engaged also in commerce [where the effect of
such acquisition] may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(1) (West Supp. 1985). "Unfair methods of competition in or affect-
ing commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful."
8. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1159. The memoranda, containing analyses of the proposed joint
venture, recommended that the FTC terminate its investigation of the joint venture because it
was unlikely the FTC would ultimately succeed on the merits. The lower court improperly
relied on the two memoranda in denying the preliminary injunction. 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,025. See infra note 28.
9. Id.
10. American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 6
ANTITR UST LAW
anticipated anticompetitive effects in their incipiency. I Some courts
have characterized the purpose as nipping monopoly in the bud.' 2
The lower court in Warner denied the preliminary injunction. In its
conclusions of law, the lower court mentioned the term "collusion" in
seven out of the eighteen stated conclusions. "Collusion is [a] secret com-
bination, conspiracy, or concert of action between two or more persons
for fraudulent or deceitful purpose[s]."' 3 The court interpreted the lower
court's use of the term collusion to define a standard of law applicable to
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'" The FTC, on the other
hand, alleged that section 7 of the Clayton Act had been violated. The
difference between section 7 and section 1 is crucial to the analysis and to
the outcome of the case. The standard for Clayton Act violations pro-
hibits mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly."' 5 The term "may be" defines a much
lighter burden than a showing of collusion required for a section 1 viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, which was applied by the lower court.
Many courts have reviewed the Clayton Act standard. It is well
established in case law that a section 7 violation is proven upon a show-
ing of reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects.I 6 This well-estab-
lished standard should have been easy for the lower court to apply.
However, the lower court required the FTC to show collusion before it
would grant a preliminary injunction. Since collusion is the standard
applied for section 1 violations of the Sherman Act, the FTC was held to
a higher burden of proof than that which should have been applied to it
based on its allegations in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit could only
conclude that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard.
The court then focused on a procedural error by the lower court.
The lower court ordered the FTC to produce the two memoranda con-
taining statisical analysis of market structures and effects on competition
which were prepared by members of the Bureau of Economics.
Although the memoranda were directly on point with the issues
11. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957). See also
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 577 F.2d 1368, 1378 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978).
12. Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 593, citing Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d
163, 169 (3rd Cir. 1953).
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240 (5th ed. 1979).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § I (West Supp. 1985). Section I prohibits every unreasonable "contract.
combination, . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West Supp. 1985).
16. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1160. See Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 274
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 921 (1982); Federal Trade Commission v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 598.
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presented to the court, the FTC contended that the memoranda were
protected from disclosure under the government's deliberative process
privilege. 7
A brief discussion of the FTC and its functions with respect to cor-
porations and preventing monopolistic control will aid the analysis of the
deliberative process privilege claimed by the FTC. The Federal Trade
Commission, through section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
has federal power to gather and compile information concerning, and to
investigate any person or firm whose business affects, commerce.'" The
FTC often gives advisory opinions to corporations or other businesses on
proposed mergers and acquisitions.' 9
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act. E0 The
purpose of the Act was to ensure that government agencies would make
available to the public a broad spectrum of information.E' Recognizing
the need for qualifications, Congress specified several exemptions to the
dissemination of government agencies' information. One such exemption
is section 552(b)(5), 22 known today as the governmental deliberative pro-
cess privilege. The FTC asserted this privilege.
Courts have repeatedly interpreted this statute to provide the gov-
ernment with a privilege permitting it to withhold documents that reflect
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part
of a process by which government decisions and policies are formu-
lated.2 3 Basically, the courts have interpreted the intent of the privilege
as two-fold: to promote frank and independent discussion among those
responsible for making government decisions 24 and to protect against
premature disclosure of proposed policies or decisions. 5
In Warner, the court utilized a two-pronged test to determine
whether the Bureau of Economics' memoranda, regarding various as-
pects of market structures and the effects on competition from the pro-
posed merger between WCI and Polygram, were privileged. First, the
17. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161.
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 46 (West Supp. 1985). See also 12 VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 126.01 (1985).
19. 16 C.F.R § 1.1 (1985).
20. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West Supp. 1985).
21. Id.
22. This exemption prevents dissemination of inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than a party in litigation with the
agency. Id. at § 552(b)(5).
23. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. See also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150
(1975) (predecisional NLRB advice memorandum considered privileged information).
24. Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973).
25. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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documents had to be predecisional-generated before the adoption of an
agency's policy or decision. 6 The court concluded that the authors of
the memoranda investigated and drafted the opinion before the FTC
made the decision to challenge the proposed joint venture. Therefore,
the documents satisfied the predecisional requirement for the privilege.
Second, the documents must have been deliberative in nature--contain-
ing opinions, recommendations, or advice about agency policies.27 The
court determined that the memoranda contained analysis and recom-
mendations sufficient to be deliberative in nature. The court concluded
that the Bureau of Economics' memoranda sufficiently satisfied all the
requirements to meet the deliberative process privilege. This ruling was
subject to several qualifications.2 8 But the court held that the qualifica-
tions applicable in the case did not outweigh the intent of the privilege as
noted earlier. Thus, the lower court abused its discretion in ordering the
production of the memoranda. E9
It is apparent why the Ninth Circuit ruled as it did. The court was
obviously protecting a governmental interest as well as itself. Without
the memoranda, the court could start fresh with its own analysis of
whether to grant preliminary relief in the case. Also, the court would not
26. Id. at 866. In Coastal States, the court added that even if the document is predeci-
sional at the time it is prepared, it can lose that status if it is adopted as the agency position on
the issue. Id. Though this has no bearing on the Warner case per se, had the Bureau of
Economics prepared the opinion after the suit was filed, the memoranda would have lost the
predecisional status. As recognized in Sears, 421 U.S. at 152, after a final decision, memoranda
are in the public interest and therefore lose the (b)(5) exemption from the statute.
27. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866.
28. The deliberative process privilege is qualified to the extent that if a litigant's need for
accurate fact-finding overrides the government's interest in non-disclosure, the litigant may
obtain deliberative materials. United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658 (6th
Cir. 1976) (court held that to override the government interest in secrecy, the court must find
that the litigant's objective, rather than its subjective, need for the documents overrides the
governmental interest in secrecy).
The Warner court used four factors to balance the competing interests: 1) the relevance of
the evidence; 2) the availability of other evidence; 3) the government's role in the litigation;
and 4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder frank and independent discussion regard-
ing contemplated policies and decisions. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. See, e.g.. Carl Zeiss Stif-
tung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 327-29 (D.D.C. 1966), affTd. 384 F.2d 979
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952, (1967); In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig.. 478
F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (court used five factors in its determination, adding the
"seriousness" of the litigation and the issues involved).
Though not binding precedent, the factors are relevant to the discussion in the case and
were properly exercised by the court. In Warner, the court determined that the memoranda
were relevant. But the other three factors outweighed the deleterious effects the court predicted
if they allowed the lower court to effectively compel disclosure of this type of memoranda.
thereby ultimately injuring the quality of agency decisions.
29. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1162.
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have to defer to the lower court's findings, since they were based on im-
properly admitted documents.
Next, the court determined whether the lower court should have
granted preliminary relief to the FTC. The court analyzed and applied
standards from long-standing precedent to reach its decision. The deci-
sion of whether to grant preliminary relief turned on a determination of
the likelihood of the FTC's success on the merits and on a balance of the
equities.
In order to meet its burden of proof with respect to success on the
merits, the FTC had to raise questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them grounds for thorough
investigation and study.3 ° Once the FTC did this, the issue was put
before a court which makes a preliminary assessment of the merger's
impact on competition. The courts have stated that because section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen
competition in any line of commerce, it is necessary to examine the ef-
fects of a merger in each such economically significant submarket.3 This
will determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the merger
will substantially lessen competition. The court in Warner found several
factors from case law applicable to this recording industry merger, which
were useful in determining the impact on competition. Some of these
included the market shares of the merging firms, the degree of concentra-
tion within the industry, and the relevant product market.32
Defining the relevant market is a burdensome yet critical process in
antitrust litigation. Both WCI and the FTC offered evidence as to the
relevant market. This decision has an important bearing on the outcome
of any proposed merger. The choice of one relevant market over another
will determine whether certain conduct may have an impact on competi-
30. Federal Trade Commission v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1979).
31. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
32. The Court in Brown Shoe generally discussed the nature of Clayton Act violations as
those actions which would substantially lessen competition. Id. at 334. The Court then stated
that in order to thoroughly examine antitrust violations with respect to either horizontal merg-
ers (mergers between business competitors, such as the proposed merger in Warner) or vertical
mergers (joining with a corporate customer or supplier), a court must look at the "effect on
competition generally in an economically significant market." Id. at 335. The significant mar-
ket is commonly referred to as the relevant market. The relevant market is determined by
examining the reasonable interchangeability of use between the product and substitutes for it.
Id. at 325. The Court held that in order to fully determine any effect on competition, the
relevant market must be analyzed. Various components of the relevant market are the product
market and the geographic market. Id. at 324. Once a court has established these markets, it
can then proceed to determine the issue of whether the merger would have an effect on compe-
tition. The Ninth Circuit has vigorously adopted Brown Shoe as the law for section 7 viola-
tions. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 618 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 6
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tion. If the effect is anticompetitive, the proposed merger will not be
permitted by the courts. Conversely, if the conduct would not affect
competition in an anticompetitive manner, then the proposed merger
would be permitted. The FTC argued that the relevant market was prer-
ecorded music.3 3 WCI contended that the relevant market was recorded
music.34 The court determined that the relevant market was prerecorded
music based on a more tenable showing by the FTC.35
The next question was whether the proposed merger would affect
the concentration within the chosen relevant market. After an assess-
ment of statistics, the court determined that the prerecorded music in-
dustry was moderately concentrated at the distributor level while the top
four record distributors commanded approximately sixty-seven percent
of the domestic market.36 If WCI and Polygram were permitted to form
a joint venture, their market share alone would be approximately twenty-
six percent while the market share of the top four firms would be approx-
imately seventy-five percent.37 This was sufficient for the court to reason
that the result of the proposed merger would definitely have anticompeti-
tive effects on the prerecorded music industry.
As a final analysis, the court found that entry into the record distri-
bution industry was very expensive.3" Since there were few indepen-
dently produced prerecorded music distributors, a new entrant would
have difficulty obtaining and sustaining enough volume to be competi-
tive. Thus, there existed a natural barrier to entry into the industry.3 9
Based on these factors, the court held that the FTC was likely to succeed
on the merits.
WCI presented cases where courts permitted mergers to occur when
the acquired company was intending to leave the distribution market due
to economic necessity and inadequate resources similar to Polygram's
33. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1163.
34. Recorded music includes home tapes of prerecorded music. Id.
35. Id. at 1163-64. The FTC offered persuasive evidence regarding the relevant market.
The Commission presented record company documents and affidavits distinguishing the re-
corded music market from the prerecorded music market. The court recognized that there
were distinct characteristics belonging to each market. Ultimately, it determined that the two
were not interchangeable. Based on that and other evidence presented by the FTC regarding
the degree of concentration in the prerecorded music market, the court held that the relevant
market to be analyzed for anticompetitive effects would be prerecorded music. Id. at 1163.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Some $125,000,000 in sales at the wholesale level is required to maintain a national
distribution operation. Id. at 1164.
39. Id.
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situation.' ° The court in Warner quickly rejected this argument, citing
cases which criticized such judicial reasoning.41 WCI presented a cogent
argument against any possible effects resulting from the proposed
merger. But the court adopted a policy argument presented by other
courts regarding the strength (or lack of strength) of a financial weakness
argument.42 Though not a rigorous analysis, the court was able to dis-
cern between the reasons for allowing and not allowing WCI's argument.
The court, in effect, conceded that WCI's argument was valid but was
insufficient by itself to justify a merger.4 3
Ultimately, the court had to reach the issue of equities; the last step
of the analysis and probably the factor with the weakest support in case
law. In addition to the FTC showing a reasonable probability of a likeli-
hood of success, the court balanced equities to reach its result. The diffi-
cult choice presented to the court was what type of equities should be
considered in an entertainment industry case such as this. The court in
Warner cited no authority that defined the equities applicable to record
company mergers. Rather, general public and private equities were
weighed against a borrowed equity affecting injunctions. The balancing
of equities by the court went through some vigorous tipping back and
forth before the case was resolved. The court was not sure of the exact
weight to place on each equity. It is well established that, although pri-
vate equities may be considered, public equities receive far greater
weight." Various types of public equities include beneficial economic
effects and pro-competitive advantages for consumers.4" The court in
Warner was unable to determine whether these equities would support or
40. Lektro- Vend Corp., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981); International Shoe Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). In International Shoe, the Court held that in some
situations where a company's resources are so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so
remote that the company faced the probability of a business failure, its capital stock may be
purchased by a competitor. If there is no other prospective purchaser and the stock is not
purchased with the purpose of lessening competition, it is not prejudicial to the public. There-
fore, the merger does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the
intent of the Clayton Act.
41. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (the issue
in an antitrust case is not a determination of the reasons for selling, but only the anticompeti-
tive effect of the sale), affd mer., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
42. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1164. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 652 F.2d 1324, 1339 (7th Cir. 1981) (financial weakness, while perhaps relevant
in some cases, is probably the weakest ground of all for justifying a merger).
43. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165.
44. Federal Trade Commission v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1083 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (equities used in the antitrust analysis). See also National Tea Co., 603 F.2d at 697 and
n.4.
45. Federal Trade Commission v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294, 299
(D.D.C. 1983).
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deny the grant of injunctive relief, since the record contained conflicting
evidence regarding economic effects and advantages.46
The court extracted an equity from a different circuit which, if ap-
plicable, would support the grant of injunctive relief. A denial of a pre-
liminary injunction would preclude effective relief if the FTC ultimately
prevailed at the trial level and divestiture were ordered.4" The court rea-
soned that if it permitted the proposed joint venture, Polygram would
dismantle its distribution operations. If a divestiture order were subse-
quently given, it would be exceedingly difficult for Polygram to revive its
operations to comply with the order.4" Fearing this potential result, the
court decided to place great weight on the borrowed equity.
WCI presented the court with a few private equities,49 but the court
refused to accept them. Though the court did say that the private equi-
ties were entitled to serious consideration, private equities alone did not
outweigh the FTC's showing of a likelihood of success."0 After placing
the weights on the scale, the court concluded that since the FTC had
demonstrated a likelihood of success and public equities supported in-
junctive relief, the scale tipped in favor of granting the preliminary
injunction."'
This academic lesson in judicial reasoning has not resulted in volu-
minous subsequent citations. In fact, since the date of the opinion, only
two cases have cited Warner.52 This should not be surprising, since the
court in Warner applied long-standing precedent that has been routinely
cited in prior cases.
Although the facts are completely different, both Warner and Re-
46. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165. Oddly, the court was able to determine such difficult statis-
tics as levels of concentration and barriers to entry into the recording distribution market, yet
they could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the benefits received by consumers from
denying the merger outweighed the effects that would result if the merger were allowed.
47. Id. at 1165. See also Federal Trade Commission v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F.
Supp. 84, 87 (N.D. I1. 1981).
48. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165.
49. WCI argued that if the joint venture were denied, Polygram would not be able to
operate effectively. Polygram asserted difficulty in signing artists as well as keeping them due
to the uncertainty of the proposed merger. WCI also argued that there were private equities in
allowing Polygram to escape its troubled financial condition and in allowing Polygram's share-
holders to reap benefits of a merger. Id. at 1165, citing United States v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., 345 F. Supp. 117, 122-24 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Great Lakes Chemical, 528 F. Supp. at 98-
99.
50. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165.
51. Id.
52. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984);
White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (Warner
was cited in the conclusions of law, listing factors relevant to determining the acquisition's
impact on competition).
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gents of University of California v. American Broadcasting Cos. involved a
lower court ruling regarding a preliminary injunction.53 The issue before
the court in Regents was whether the lower court abused its discretion in
granting a preliminary injunction. The court followed an analysis similar
to that used by the Warner court.54 In finding that the plaintiff had a fair
chance of succeeding on the merits of the underlying antitrust litigation,
the court in Regents ruled that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in
favor of the plaintiff and therefore affirmed the lower court decision.55
The dissent in Regents56 thought that, with respect to equities, the
majority failed to consider some personal equities that the defendant
would suffer if the preliminary injunction were affirmed. Warner was
cited for support of this position. 7 The dissent cited to language in
Warner stating that private injuries are entitled to serious considera-
tion.58 The dissent obviously failed to read the entire statement in
Warner. The Warner court held that although private injuries are enti-
tled to serious consideration, private equities alone do not outweigh a
plaintifJ's showing of a likelihood of success.5 9 The majority in Regents
determined that the plaintiff had a fair chance of succeeding on the
merits.6"
Perhaps the dissent in Regents thought that the majority did not pay
enough attention to the private equities. With a narrow reading of the
language in Warner, the dissent believed that the defendant should not
have been denied a stay of the preliminary injunction.61 The problem
with that analysis is that Warner cannot and should not be taken so nar-
rowly. It is clear from Warner that private equities are not sufficient to
deny relief if the plaintiff shows a likelihood of success on the merits of
the underlying litigation. The dissent attempted to narrowly extract lan-
guage from Warner. Upon a proper reading, the use of Warner in the
dissent is unpersuasive.
Warner will have a salutary effect on the law. Its consistent inter-
pretation and sound reasoning of antitrust law in the entertainment in-
dustry lends itself to strong precedent. Joint ventures and mergers in the
53. Regents, 747 F.2d at 521-22.
54. Id. at 521. The court analyzed the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits, bal-
anced the hardships, and considered the public interest.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 522. The dissent was written by Judge Beezer.
57. Id. at 525.
58. Id., citing Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165.
59. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1165.
60. Regents, 747 F.2d at 521.
61. The dissent also questioned the other issues analyzed by the majority, including the
likelihood of success on the merits and the balancing of hardships. Id.
[Vol. 6
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entertainment industry are a growing concern. As motion picture and
recording companies join their operations, the more difficult it becomes
for new competition to break in. Cases such as Warner indicate that the
law is providing a strong right arm for competitors. The antitrust laws
were established to prevent anticompetitive conduct.
Ultimately, WCI and Polygram dismantled their merger plans. To-
day, both appear to be viable companies in the prerecorded music distri-
bution market. Who knows? Someday Polygram may be the record label
for the next FTC album. Then again, that too may have a drastic effect
on the entertainment industry.
Jerome B. Friedman

